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REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

Abstract

Everyone knows that ducks lay eggs and that ducks quack. It is also clear that neither laying
eggs, nor quacking is an accidental property of being a duck. They are lawfully connected to
being a duck. In fact, both properties are understood to have a principled connection to the kind,
duck (Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). Despite these similarities, the
representation of knowledge of the sex-linked properties of a kind poses difficult problems for
current theories of conceptual representation and how generic knowledge is represented.
Theories of conceptual representation seek to represent what is shared by instances of a kind, but
the sex-linked properties are possessed by half or fewer instances (often only mature, healthy
male/female instances). Furthermore, the property appears to be lawfully connected to only
instances of one type of instance and thus one would expect the property to only be included in
our concept of that type of instance (e.g. female ducks for laying eggs), but not the other type of
instance (e.g. male ducks for laying eggs). For the same reason, it seems like the generic Female
ducks lay eggs should be licensed, but Ducks lay eggs should not be licensed, even though it
clearly is. Four experiments provided evidence that we represent principled connections between
kinds and sex-linked properties such that one type of instance of the kind has a principled
connection for the presence of the property and the other type has a principled connection for the
absence of that property. We discuss the implications of the results for theories of conceptual
representation and generics.

Keywords: Conceptual representation, Kind representations, Generic knowledge,
Principled connections
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REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCEPTUAL
REPRESENTATION AND GENERICS

Categories play a vital role in our understanding of the world around us. Categories
simplify the process of incorporating new information by allowing us to generalize and make
predictions about a certain population, rather than an individual thing. This allows a person to
skip the process of relearning information, and instead categorize and reason about new
information using what is already known. If we are presented with an item that we’ve never seen
before, we respond by utilizing the information that we already possess to categorize this neverbefore-seen item. We use this information to reason about this new item, which in turn guides
our expectations regarding how to think and act with this new item. The mental representations
that we form regarding categories are referred to as concepts. Categories and concepts act as
building blocks for human thought and behavior (Medin, 1989). The process of how categories
are represented and organized by individuals is known as conceptual representation (Markman,
2006).
Thinking and talking about kinds and instances of kinds
Kind concepts refer to categories such as dog, table, or tree, as opposed to a more general
category such as “white things” or “round things”. Kinds involve a collection of correlated
properties and possess a causal structure. (Markman, 2006). Recently, one way that people have
been studying how we represent concepts, specifically kind concepts, is by studying generics
(Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2009). We naturally think and talk about things as
members or instances of kinds. Generic knowledge involves kinds of things. A statement is
considered to be generic if it conveys a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Ducks
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lay eggs” or “Lions have manes” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008).
Generics are said to play a vital role in children’s conceptual development (Gelman, 2009).
Children as young as two and a half years old can comprehend and use generic sentences (e.g.,
“dogs have four legs”) to think and talk about kinds and their instances and the properties that
distinguish these kinds (Gelman, 2003).
Generic sentences provide an inside perspective into our conceptual systems and offer
insight on the ways in which our conceptual system can represent kinds of things and the
connections between kinds and properties that characterize kinds and their instances. Kind
representations play a significant role in human thought and language; kind representations can
refer to all kinds of entities and range from non-living things, such as a paperclip, to living
things, such as a dog. Kind representations “underlie the meanings of most count and mass nouns
in natural language, and as such, they provide an important interface between non-linguistic
conceptual structure and combinatorial, hierarchical, unbounded linguistically expressible
thought” (Haward, Wagner, Careya and Prasada, 2018, p. 255). In linguistics, mass nouns refer
to nouns that name something which cannot usually be counted and is referred to in the singular
(i.e., air, advice, etc.); count nouns refer to nouns that can usually be counted (i.e., dog, table,
etc.) (Wisniewski, Lamb, & Middleton, 2003). Given the significant role that kind
representations play in common sense thought and language, research on the acquisition and
understanding of characteristics of kinds is a significant aspect of theories of conceptual
representation (Gelman, 2003; Prasada, 2016). By utilizing a conceptually based approach to
studying generics, and by focusing on the many ways in which our conceptual systems represent
connections between kinds and properties, we can uncover domain-general ways in which our
concepts of kinds are constructed (Prasada & Dillingham, 2009).
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When we talk about things like dogs or tables, we are talking about indefinitely many
things that belong to a kind. Rather than listing every single dog or table that exists, we instead
refer to them as a single abstract kind, which is understood to contain indefinitely many
instances. However, when we talk about one specific dog, we would refer to an instance of the
kind. To refer to something as an instance of a kind is to think of it as one of indefinitely many
things of that kind (Prasada, 2016). Prasada (2016) has proposed that we have mechanisms for
thinking about kinds and instances of kinds. Instances of kind representations have the format
illustrated in (1). This can go on indefinitely as each representation (k) in (1) provides us with the
means of thinking about each different instance of the same kind. (2) illustrates a generative
type-token mechanism for representing the kind, which implicitly contains the representations of
indefinitely many instances of the kind (Prasada, 2016).
(1) K1 K2
(2)

K3 . . .

Ki
One important aspect of the above kind representations is that they also support the dual,

and simultaneous, function of thinking about kinds as instances of a kind, and thinking about
kinds, themselves (Prasada, 2016). An example of this is that we can think about Fido the dog as
an instance of the kind dog, but we also possess the ability to think about dogs as a kind when we
think about dogs, for example, as a kind evolving from wolves as a kind. We are not thinking of
individual dogs evolving from individual wolves, but rather the whole category (kind) dogs
evolving from the whole category (kind) wolves (Gelman, 2003).
Characterizing kinds
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There are three different ways to characterize kinds based upon how a property is
connected to the kind and consequently, our conceptual systems distinguish at least three ways of
representing the connections between kinds and their properties (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006,
2009; Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). These three ways consist of statistical,
causal, and principled connections.
Properties that possess a principled connection to the kind are thought to be an aspect of
being that kind of thing. Principled connections include properties that instances of a kind have
by virtue of their being the kinds of things that they are, such as having four legs and being a
dog. Principled connections (i) license formal explanations that explain the presence of the
property in the kind by reference to the kind (e.g., that has four legs because it is a dog), (ii)
license normative expectations concerning the presence of the property in the kind (e.g., “That
dog, by virtue of being a dog, should have four legs”; we judge there to be something wrong with
a dog that does not have four legs), and (iii) license the expectation that the kind will generally
possess the property (Prasada and Dillingham, 2006).
Formal explanations allow for a property of an instance of a kind to be accounted for by
referencing the kind of thing it is (i.e., “That dog has four legs because it is a dog”). Normative
expectations foster the expectation that instances of the kind should have certain properties to
which the kind has a principled connection (i.e., “That dog, by virtue of being a dog, should have
four legs”). Instances which may lack such a property can be deemed “defective or incomplete”
(i.e., A dog with three legs). Lastly, the statistical component of principled connections asserts
that principled connections permit the expectation that a property will generally be very common
(i.e., “Most dogs are expected to have four legs”). A generic example would include looking at
the principled connection between having four legs and being a dog. In other words, having four
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legs is thought to be an aspect of being a dog (formal explanation), we would likely judge there
to be something wrong with a dog that had 3 legs (normative expectation), and the majority of
dogs will have four legs (statistical connection). Individuals represent principled connections
between the type of thing something is (e.g., a dog) and some of its properties but not others. For
example, there is a principled connection between the kind dog and the property of having four
legs however, there is no principled connection between the kind dog and the property of
wearing a collar. There is, however, a statistical connection present in both examples.
Statistical connections represent properties which are highly statistically correlated with
certain kinds. Statistical connections are present in generics such as “barns are red” or “dogs
wear collars”. Although principled connections license a statistical connection, this is not the
case the other way around; statistical connections do not license a principled connection.
Statistical connections only involve properties which are prevalent amongst instances of a kind
and they do not support formal explanations or normative expectations (Prasada & Dillingham,
2006). Properties that have a principled connection to a kind are represented as aspects of being
that kind of thing (Prasada & Dillingham, 2009). Although barns tend to be red, the property
being red is not considered an aspect of being a barn nor would there be anything wrong with a
barn that is not red.
A causal connection between a kind and a property is distinguished by the shared nature
of the members of the kind causing them to be disposed to have the property in question
(Prasada, 2010). A few members of the kind possessing the property is not enough to define a
causal connection; instead, there must be something about the nature of the kind that causally
grounds the presence of the property in the kind. An example of a causal connection would be
the kind ticks and the property of carrying Lyme disease. Even though we know that not all ticks
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carry Lyme disease, their common biological makeup causes ticks to be prone to carrying Lyme
disease. Causal connections do not have a formal or normative requirement (Prasada, Khemlani,
Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). As such, the property carrying Lyme disease would not be an aspect
of being a tick nor would there be anything wrong with a tick that did not carry Lyme disease.
Although individuals generally know that these type of striking property generics (e.g., “Ticks
carry Lyme disease”) do not apply to the large majority of instances of the kind (e.g., Not all
ticks carry Lyme disease), they still judge these striking property generics to be true (Prasada,
Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013), and this is due to the presence of causal connections.
Causal connections differ from principled connections in that a high prevalence of the property
in the kind is not enough to label the connection as a causal connection. For example, “dogs wear
collars” is judged to be true however, it is not because the nature of being a dog causally grounds
the presence of a collar.
One important factor to note is that although we have distinguished three different
connection types, this does not mean that properties and their kinds are exclusive to one of these
connections. There may be given kinds and given properties that fall into all three categories of
connections. An example of this would be the kind dog and the property of having four legs. As
mentioned previously, there is a statistical connection (high prevalence) between this property
and kind; there is also a principled connection between this property and kind; lastly, the nature
of being a dog could causally ground the property of having four legs. Each connection type
“grounds different kinds of linguistic and nonlinguistic phenomena” and does not result in only
one connection type being equivalent to each property and kind combination (Prasada,
Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). Research has also shown that children as young as four
years old can differentiate between principled and statistical connections. When asked about

REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

9

properties that have statistical connections and properties that have principled connections to a
kind, children and adults had normative expectations, and were more likely to provide a formal
explanation, when referring to the properties that have principled connections to the kind
(Haward, Wagner, Careya & Prasada, 2018).
Distinguishing instances versus distinguishing kinds
When we think about instances of the kind dogs, we do not require two different dogs to
have different characteristics. A numerical difference does not imply any qualitative differences.
Any specific thing that we can think of will likely have an unlimited number in the category and
instances will likely be different from one another. This is not so obvious in the kind paperclips,
but it is evident in the kind dogs. Most instances differ from one another numerically and
qualitatively (e.g., Spot is a brown dog; Fido is a white dog). However, we treat these qualitative
differences as noise. Being brown isn’t an aspect of being a dog, but having four legs is. There
are properties that have principled connections to the kind (e.g., four legs) and those are the
properties that we expect all instances to possess. Likewise, those are the properties that we have
formal explanations for, and those are also the properties that the kind is supposed to have. These
properties are non-accidentally connected to being a dog. It is important to note that there are
other properties, such as those that possess causal or statistical connections to the kind, that are
also non-accidentally connected to the kind. However, we do not possess formal explanations or
normative expectations for these connection types.
The problem with minority trait characteristics (sex-linked properties)
It is widely known that ducks lay eggs and that ducks quack. It is also clear that neither
laying eggs, nor quacking, is an accidental property of being a duck. These two properties are
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lawfully connected to being a duck. Both of these properties (i.e., laying eggs, quacking) are
understood to have a principled connection to the kind (duck) in that both are understood to be
an aspect of being a duck (Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). Both properties also
support formal explanations (i.e., “That lays eggs because it is a duck” and “That quacks because
it is a duck”), and both properties support normative expectations (i.e., “Ducks are supposed to
lay eggs” and “Ducks are supposed to quack”) (Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013).
When we compare these two properties, there is an obvious difference between quacking and
laying eggs. Quacking is a property that most regular functioning ducks would normally possess
however, laying eggs is a property that only mature, female ducks would normally possess.
Minority characteristic (or “sex-linked property”) generics such as “ducks lay eggs” and
“lions have manes” are similar to principled generics as they involve properties that seem to be
part of the nature of the kind however, they differ from principled generics in that they involve
properties that tend to be possessed by half or fewer instances of the kind (i.e., only fertile,
mature female ducks lay eggs) (Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013).
Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg’s (2013) research on minority characteristic
generics found that minority characteristics possess principled connections to the kind. One
problem with this way of thinking about minority characteristics possessing principled
connections to the kind is that this implies that all ducks that do not lay eggs (i.e., male ducks)
must have something wrong with them. One way that previous research suggests we deal with
sex-linked property generics is by suggesting that there is a lawful connection to one sex (i.e., the
sex linked to the minority characteristic trait/sex-linked property) and not the other (i.e., Lions
have manes really means male lions have manes). The problem with this suggestion is that if
they appear to be lawfully connected to only instances of one type, they should be included in the

REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

11

concept of that type (female ducks for laying eggs), but not the other type (male ducks for laying
eggs). For the same reason, the generic "Female ducks lay eggs" should be licensed, but "Ducks
lay eggs" should not.
Lastly, Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg (2013) concluded that although
principled connections underlie minority characteristic generics, the statistical aspect of
principled connections only serves to ground the expectation that most instances of the kind will
possess the property, not require that most instances of the kind possess the property (Prasada,
Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). The problem with this suggestion is that we expect most
male lions to have manes and most female lions not to have manes rather than an expectation
that most instances of the kind will possess the property.
When we think about the kind lions, it is clear that male lions have manes and female
lions do not have manes. The differences between the male instances and the female instances
are not accidental; they are principled. The distinction between male and female is a difference
between instances, not a way of dividing lions into sub kinds (e.g., as we do with differed breeds
of dogs). An important distinction to make is that sex differences differ from sub kinds due to the
fact that we can apply sex differences at multiple levels. We can talk about male and female
animals, or male and female dogs, or male and female collies. Distinguishing by sex is a level
independent way of distinguishing differences in animal kinds or sub kinds. If we look solely at
male lions, they need only differ numerically. Some may be a different shade than others, some
may have spots, and some may be smaller. However, these differences are accidental. The same
goes for female lions. Now if we compare the differences between male lions and female lions,
these differences will be principled in terms of their reproductive capabilities.
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Theories of conceptual representation stipulate how instances of kinds are all akin and
assume that the ways in which instances vary is not systematic. As such, there is no way of
dealing with representing the systematic ways in which instances of animal categories, that also
differ in sex, differ from one another. It is evident that the way sex-linked properties of a kind are
represented is problematic. The experiments in this study aim to address this problem. The
primary goal of this study is to further investigate the types of connections our conceptual
systems represent between kinds and properties, while specifically looking at sex-linked
properties and how they are represented.
We hypothesize that the principled difference between the two types of instances of sex is
due to instances of one type having a principled connection for the presence of a sex-linked
property, and the other type having a principled connection for the absence of that property. For
example, there is a principled connection between the kind duck and egg-laying such that female
ducks are expected to have the property, and male ducks are expected to not have the property.
For the kind lion, there is a principled connection between the kind lion and the property of
having a mane such that male lions are expected to have the property, and female lions are not
expected to have the property. We investigate how the properties are linked to the representation
of the kind, and investigate instances of each sex.
This hypothesis is an improvement to current theories of minority characteristic generics
because if proven true, the sex that is not linked to the property will not be deemed as having
something wrong with it (i.e., “there is something wrong with a female lion that does not have a
mane”). This would also establish the expectation that all or most of the sex-linked instances
have the property, and all or most of the non-sex-linked instances lack the property (i.e., We
expect all or most male lions to have a mane and all or most female lions to not have a mane).
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To test our hypothesis, we have conducted four experiments. Experiment 1 investigates
whether formal explanations will be supported for both the presence (“That lays eggs because
it’s a female duck.”) and the absence (“That does not lay eggs because it’s a male duck.”) of the
sex-linked property. Experiment 2 investigates whether normative expectations will be supported
for both the presence (“Female ducks are supposed to lay eggs.”) and the absence (“Male ducks
are not supposed to lay eggs”) of the sex-linked property. Experiment 3 investigates the
normative expectations in a more detailed manner, while also tying the formal explanations and
normative expectations together. Lastly, experiment 4 ties together the normative expectations
and the statistical expectations licensed by principled connections to sex-linked properties.
Experiment 1
Principled connections license formal explanations explaining the presence of the
property in the kind by referencing the kind (Prasada and Dillingham, 2006). Experiment 1
investigates the presence of formal explanations in animal kinds that possess sex-linked
properties. Experiment 1 follows a similar format to Prasada and Dillingham’s (2006, 2009)
studies on formal explanations, where participants were presented with a question and a variety
of explanations (including formal explanations). Participants were then asked to rate the
naturalness of the response on a 7-point scale. Experiment 1 investigates formal explanations in
animal kinds with sex-linked properties. Sex-linked properties have principled connections to the
kind even though roughly half of the instances do not possess the property. Given that principled
connections support formal explanations (explanations by reference to a category), we
hypothesized that formal explanations for the presence of the sex-linked properties would be
better when the formal explanation cited the kind (e.g., “because it is a lion”), or the sex linked to
the property (e.g., “because it is a male lion”), than when it cited the opposite sex. On the other
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hand, formal explanations for the absence of the sex-linked property will be better when the sex
that is not linked to the property is cited (e.g., “because it is a female lion”) than when the kind
(e.g., “because it is a lion) or the sex linked to the property (e.g., “because it is a male lion”) is
cited.
Method
Participants
Two hundred individuals, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in this
survey which was hosted on Qualtrics. All participants were native English speakers, 18 years or
older, and residing in the United States. The survey completion time was approximately 15
minutes. Each participant that completed the survey received $1.50 for participating.
Materials
A total of 78 questions were presented in the survey. 48 questions were presented
regarding formal explanations, equating to 6 questions per animal kind. 8 animal kinds were used
throughout this experiment, and the experiments that follow. The eight chosen animal kinds were
the ones that we felt possessed well known sex-linked properties, such as manes for lions or
laying eggs for ducks. Three of the six questions for each animal kind involved the presence of
the sex-linked property, and the other three questions involved the absence of the sex-linked
property. Each of the three questions started out identical (e.g., “why does that [pointing to a
lion] have a mane?” or “why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a mane?” however, the
responses received were varied. The three responses consisted of different explanation types
(e.g., “because it is a lion”, “because it is a male lion”, “because it is a female lion”).
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This study also included 24 true or false questions (e.g., “Lions have manes”) to assess
individuals’ general knowledge about sex-linked properties. We included this second part due to
the possibility that not everyone would know these facts, in which case they would just be
adding noise to the data and would not bear on the hypothesis. We wanted to ensure the
possibility of potentially removing the trials that people did not know about and reanalyzing the
data. Given that these results came out statistically significant, we decided not to utilize these
true or false questions. This study also included six attention checks (e.g., “Select the number x
from the below options.”), which were answered 99% correctly by all participants, showing that
they were paying attention to the questions presented.
Procedure
Each participant took the same survey, with all questions displayed in random order (see
Appendix A for full stimuli and question descriptions). The structure was the same for each
question. Participants were shown a question which hypothesized two individuals speaking to
one another. The question was structured in the following manner: “Suppose someone asked,
‘why does that [pointing to a lion] have a mane?’ Suppose they received the reply ‘Because it is
a lion.’ Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was
asked.” The participant was asked to rate the formal explanation response from a scale of one to
seven, one signifying that the response in question was completely unnatural and seven
signifying that the response in question was completely natural. The question is used to establish
formal explanations between the property and the kind. In theory, the presence of formal
explanations would result in a higher rating.
Results
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A 3x2 ANOVA examined the effects of formal explanation type (kind, sex linked to
property, sex not linked to property) and property status (present, absent) on the formal
explanation judgement ratings. A subject and item analysis, followed by planned comparisons,
were used to test whether in the presence of the sex-linked property (e.g., mane), the kind (e.g.,
lion) and the sex-linked to the property (e.g., male lion) explanation types received higher
naturalness ratings than the sex not linked to the property (e.g., female lion) explanation types.
This was also used to test whether in the absence of the sex-linked property, the sex not linked to
the property (e.g., female lion) received higher naturalness ratings than the kind (e.g., lion) or the
sex linked to the property (e.g., male lion). The item analysis allows for us to generalize the
results to the whole population of animals and sex-linked properties.

Mean Standard Deviation
4.86
1.46
Property Present in Sex Linked
6.33
.84
Property Present in Sex Not Linked 3.00
1.89
Property Absent in Kind
2.45
1.54
Property Absent in Sex Linked
2.67
1.91
Property Absent in Sex Not Linked
6.21
.85
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of formal explanation ratings for the presence and absence of sex linked
properties in kinds.
Property Present in Kind

Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for each measure in Experiment 1. The property
refers to the sex-linked property in each of the explanation types. When explaining the presence
of a sex-linked property (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck) lay eggs?”), formal
explanations that referenced the kind (i.e., Because it is a duck) (M=4.86), or to the sex linked to
the property (Because it is a female duck) (M=6.33), received significantly higher ratings than
those that referenced the opposite sex (i.e., Because it is a male duck) (M=3.00). For the absence
of the property, formal explanations referencing the opposite sex (i.e., Because it is male duck)
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received higher ratings (M=6.21) than those referencing the sex linked to the property (i.e.,
Because it is a female duck) (M=2.67) or the kind (i.e., Because it is a duck) (M=2.45).
For the subject analysis, a two-way (2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the
effect of presence and explanation type on formal explanation ratings. There was a statistically
significant interaction between the effects of presence and explanation type on formal
explanation ratings, F (2, 398) = 524.38, p<.001, η2 = .73. The analysis revealed a main effect of
presence, F (1,199) =362.73, p<.001, η2 = .65 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 398)
=122.28, p<.001, η2 = .38. Next, we ran pairwise t-tests to understand the nature of this
interaction.
7

6.33

6
4.86

Rating

5
4

3.00
3
2
1
0
Kind

Sex Linked to Property

Sex Not Linked to Property

Explanation Type

Figure 1. Mean formal explanation ratings for the presence of sex-linked properties in kinds.
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7

6.21

6

Rating
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2.45

2.67
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1
0
Kind

Sex Linked to Property

Sex Not Linked to Property

Explanation Type

Figure 2. Mean formal explanation ratings for the absence of sex-linked properties in kinds.

Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, for the presence of
the property (Figure 1), the kind (t(199) = 11.72 , p < .001) and the sex-linked to the property
(t(199)= 22.62 , p < .001) were both significantly higher than the sex not linked to the property.
Additionally, the sex-linked to the property received significantly higher ratings (t(199)= 13.55,
p<.001) than the kind. For the absence of the property (Figure 2), the sex-not linked to the
property was significantly higher (t(199)= 29.35, p< .001) than the kind and also significantly
higher (t(199)= 24.23, p<.001) than the sex-linked to the property.
For the item analysis, a two-way (2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect
of presence and explanation type on formal explanation ratings. There was a statistically
significant interaction between the effects of presence and explanation type on formal
explanation ratings, F (2, 14) =214.38, p<.001, η2 = .97. The analysis revealed a main effect of
presence, F (1,7) =98.00, p<.001, η2 = .93 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 14) =293.98,
p<.001, η2 = .98.
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Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, for the presence of
the property, the kind (t(7) = 13.79 , p < .001) and the sex-linked to the property (t(7)= 15.54 , p
< .001) were both significantly higher than the sex not linked to the property. Additionally, the
sex-linked to the property received significantly higher ratings (t(7)= 8.36, p<.001) than the kind.
For the absence of the property, the sex-not linked to the property was significantly higher (t(7)=
25.05, p< .001) than the kind and also significantly higher (t(7)= 14.80, p<.001) than the sexlinked to the property.
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides evidence that participants found it natural to explain the existence
of sex-linked properties by citing the kind and the sex linked to the property. It also provides
evidence that participants found it natural to explain the absence of sex-linked properties by
citing the sex not linked to the property. In other words, experiment 1 confirms our hypothesis
regarding the presence of formal explanations in sex-linked properties. For the presence of the
sex-linked property, it is clear that formal explanations are present in the kind and the sex-linked
to the property (i.e., lions and male lions for manes). For the absence of the sex-linked property,
formal explanations are present in the sex not linked to the property (i.e., female lions for
manes).
Experiment 2

Along with formal explanations, principled connections also license normative
expectations regarding the property in the kind (Prasada and Dillingham, 2006). Experiment 2
investigates the normative expectations in animal kinds regarding sex-linked properties. Given
that principled connections support normative expectations, we predicted that statements
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involving a normative expectation for the presence of a sex-linked property (e.g. possessing a
mane) would be judged to be true when the statement involves the kind (e.g., “lions are supposed
to have manes”) or the sex linked to the property (e.g., “male lions are supposed to have
manes”), but be judged to be false when the statement involves the opposite sex (e.g., “female
lions are supposed to have manes”). We predicted that the kind and sex-linked categories will
receive similar ratings. On the other hand, we predicted that statements involving normative
expectations for the absence of the sex-linked property will be judged to be true when the sex
that is not linked to the property is cited (e.g., “female lions are supposed to not have manes”),
but false when the statement involves the kind (e.g., “lions are supposed to not have manes”) or
the sex linked to the property (e.g., “male lions are supposed to not have manes”).
Method
Participants
A total of 196 individuals, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in this
survey which was hosted on Qualtrics. All participants were native English speakers, 18 years or
older, and residing in the United States. The survey completion time was approximately 15
minutes. Each participant that completed the survey received $1.50 for participating.
Materials
A total of 52 questions were presented in the survey for experiment 2. Out of these, 48
questions were directly related to assessing normative expectations, equating to 6 questions per
animal kind. 8 animal kinds were used throughout this experiment (the same animal kinds as
experiment 1). The eight chosen animal kinds were the ones that we felt possessed well known
sex-linked properties, such as manes for lions or laying eggs for ducks. Three of the six
statements for each animal kind involved the presence of the sex-linked property, and the other
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three statements involved the absence of the sex-linked property. The kind/sub kind (i.e., kind,
male kind, female kind) were substituted in each of the three statements for presence and
absence. The general structure of each statement followed the following format: “Expectation
type (i.e., lions/male lions/female lions are (supposed to/supposed to not) have sex-linked
property (i.e., manes). This study also included four attention checks (e.g., “Select the number x
from the below options.”), which were answered 99% correctly by all participants, showing that
they were paying attention to the questions presented.
Procedure
Each participant took the same survey, with all questions displayed in random order (see
Appendix B for full stimuli and question descriptions). The structure was the same for each
question. Participants were shown a statement and then were asked to judge the extent to which
the statement struck them as true or false on a 7-point scale. For each question, the participant
would see a statement such as “lions are supposed to have manes” or “lions are supposed to not
have manes”. The participant is then asked to rate the statement on a 7-point scale from negative
three to positive three, negative three signifying that the statement in question struck the
participant as definitely false and positive three signifying that the statement in question struck
the participant as definitely true. The statement and ratings are used to establish normative
expectations between the property and the kind. In theory, the presence of normative
expectations would result in a higher truth rating.
A 3x2 ANOVA examined the effects of expectation type (kind, sex linked to property,
sex not linked to property) and property status (present, absent) on the judgement ratings. This
was a within-subject design as each subject provided ratings for items in each condition. A
subject and item analysis, followed by planned comparisons, was used to test whether in the
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presence of the sex-linked property (e.g., mane), the kind (e.g., lion) and the sex-linked to the
property (e.g., male lion) expectation types received higher truth ratings than the sex not linked
to the property (e.g., female lion) expectation types. This was also used to test whether in the
absence of the sex-linked property, the sex not linked to the property (e.g., female lion) received
higher truth ratings than the kind (e.g., lion) or the sex linked to the property (e.g., male lion).
Results

Mean
Standard Deviation
1.75
.87
Property Present in Sex Linked
2.53
.62
Property Present in Sex Not Linked
-1.91
1.03
Property Absent in Kind
-1.98
.88
Property Absent in Sex Linked
-2.42
.80
Property Absent in Sex Not Linked
1.76
1.03
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of normative expectation ratings for the presence and absence of sex linked
properties in kinds.
Property Present in Kind

Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for each measure in Experiment 2. The property
refers to the sex-linked property in each of the explanation types. When referring to the presence
of the sex-linked property (i.e., mane), the statements with normative expectations that
referenced the kind (i.e., lions are supposed to have manes) (M=1.75), or the sex linked to the
property (i.e., male lions are supposed to have manes) (M=2.53), received significantly higher
ratings than those that referenced the opposite sex (i.e., female lions are supposed to have manes)
(M= -1.91). For the absence of the property, normative expectations referencing the opposite sex
(i.e., female lions are supposed to not have manes) received higher ratings (M=1.76) than those
referencing the sex linked to the property (i.e., male lions are supposed to not have manes) (M= 2.42) or the kind (i.e., lions are supposed to not have manes) (M= -1.98).
For the subject analysis, a two-way (2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the
effect of presence and explanation type on normative expectation ratings. There was a
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statistically significant interaction between the effects of presence and explanation type on
normative expectation ratings, F (2,390) =1,537.10, p<.001, η2 = .89. The analysis revealed a
main effect of presence, F (1,195) =771.41, p<.001, η2 = .80 and a main effect of explanation, F
(2, 390) =17.53, p<.001, η2 = .08. Next, we ran pairwise t-tests to understand the nature of this
interaction.
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Figure 3. Mean normative expectation ratings for the absence of sex-linked properties in kinds.
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Figure 4. Mean normative expectation ratings for the absence of sex-linked properties in kinds.

Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, for the presence of
the property (Figure 3), the kind and the sex-linked to the property were both significantly higher
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than the sex not linked to the property. For the absence of the property (Figure 4), the sex-not
linked to the property was significantly higher than the kind and the sex-linked to the property.
Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, for the presence of
the property (Figure 3), the kind (t(195) = 39.35 , p < .001) and the sex-linked to the property
(t(195)= 43.05 , p < .001) were both significantly higher than the sex not linked to the property.
Additionally, the sex-linked to the property received significantly higher ratings (t(195)= 12.69,
p<.001) than the kind. For the absence of the property (Figure 4), the sex-not linked to the
property was significantly higher (t(195)= 37.07, p< .001) than the kind and also significantly
higher (t(195)= 38.32, p<.001) than the sex-linked to the property.
For the item analysis, a two-way (2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect
of presence and explanation type on normative expectation ratings. There was a statistically
significant interaction between the effects of presence and explanation type on normative
expectation ratings, F (2,14) =258.54, p<.001, η2 = .97. The analysis revealed a main effect of
presence, F (1,7), =147.42, p<.001, η2 = .96 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 14) =32.89,
p<.001, η2 = .83.
Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, for the presence of
the property (Figure 3), the kind (t(7) = 18.39 , p < .001) and the sex-linked to the property (t(7)=
17.46 , p < .001) were both significantly higher than the sex not linked to the property.
Additionally, the sex-linked to the property received significantly higher ratings (t(7)= 9.21,
p<.001) than the kind. For the absence of the property (Figure 4), the sex-not linked to the
property was significantly higher (t(7)= 15.73, p< .001) than the kind and also significantly
higher (t(7)= 14.60, p<.001) than the sex-linked to the property.

25

REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

Discussion
Experiment 2 provides evidence that when considering the presence of a sex-linked
property (i.e., a mane), participants judged there to be normative expectations for the kind (i.e.,
lions are supposed to have manes) and the sex linked to this property (i.e., male lions are
supposed to have manes). When considering the absence of a sex-linked property, participants
only judged there to be normative expectations for the sex not linked to the property (i.e., female
lions are supposed to not have manes). In other words, experiment 2 confirms our hypothesis
regarding the normative expectations for sex-linked properties.
Experiment 3
As mentioned previously, principled connections support both formal explanations and
normative expectations. Because of this, instances that lack a property they are supposed to have
or have a property they are not supposed to have should be thought of as having something
wrong with them and thus to be mutant members of the kind. In addition, the presence or
absence of the property in such cases should be explainable by reference to the fact that they are
mutant members of the kind.
This experiment compares sex-linked properties in animal kinds to shared properties in
animal kinds. If a female lion is missing a tail, it will likely be thought of as a mutant, which
inherently provides evidence that there are normative expectations for the presence of a tail in a
female lion. However, if a female lion is missing a mane, it will likely not be thought of as a
mutant because according to our hypothesis of how sex-linked properties are represented, female
lions are expected to not have manes. This experiment further investigates the hypothesis that
there is a principled connection between the presence of a sex-linked property and the sex that is
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linked to this property, as well as a principled connection between the absence of a sex-linked
property and the opposite sex. Experiment 3 also allows us to simultaneously investigate formal
explanations and normative expectations in sex-linked properties of animal kinds.
We predicted that for the presence of the sex-linked property, formal explanations that
reference the mutant kind and the mutant sex linked to the property will receive lower ratings
than those that reference the mutant sex not linked to the property. For the absence of the sexlinked property, we predicted that formal explanations that reference the mutant kind and the
mutant sex linked to the property will receive higher ratings than the mutant sex not linked to the
property. The shared properties will serve as our control condition. For the presence of the
shared properties, we predict that all ratings will be low, regardless of explanation type (i.e.,
mutant kind, mutant sex-linked, mutant non-sex-linked). For the absence of the property, we
predict that all of the ratings will be higher than the ratings in the shared present condition. We
also predict that in the absence of the shared property, the mutant kind explanation will be rated
higher than both the mutant sex-linked and the mutant non-sex-linked explanations.
Method
Participants
A total of 177 individuals, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in this
survey which was hosted on the Qualtrics platform. All participants were native English
speakers, 18 years or older, and residing in the United States. The survey completion time was
approximately 25 minutes. Each participant that completed the survey received $1.50 for
participating.
Materials
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A total of 100 questions were presented in the survey. Out of these, 96 questions were
asked specifically referring to animal kinds, equating to 12 questions per animal kind. 8 animal
kinds were used throughout this experiment. The eight chosen animal kinds were the ones that
we felt possessed well known sex-linked properties, such as manes for lions or laying eggs for
ducks. This experiment included sex-linked properties (i.e., manes for lions) and shared
properties (i.e., tails for lions) to compare how participants rate a property that all instances of
the kind have with a property that is only linked to one sex. There were 6 questions pertaining to
the sex-linked property, and 6 questions pertaining to the shared property. Three of the six
questions for each property type involved the presence of the property, and the other three
statements involved the absence of the property. The kind/sub kind (i.e., mutant kind, mutant
male kind, mutant female kind) were substituted in each of the three responses for presence and
absence. This study also included four attention checks (e.g., “Select the number x from the
below options.”), which were answered 99% correctly by all participants, showing that they were
paying attention to the questions presented.
Procedure
Each participant took the same survey, with all questions displayed in random order (see
Appendix C for full stimuli and question descriptions). This experiment mimics the question
structure of experiment 1. Participants were shown a question which hypothesized two
individuals speaking to one another. The question was structured in the following manner:
“Suppose someone asked, ‘why does that [pointing to a lion] have a mane?’ Suppose they
received the reply ‘Because it is a mutant lion.’ Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a
response to the question that was asked.” The participant was asked to rate the formal
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explanation response on a 7-point scale, with one signifying that the response in question was
completely unnatural and seven signifying that the response in question was completely natural.
This study was structured as a 3x2x2 factorial design with category about which the
normative expectation is stated (kind, sex linked to property, sex not linked to property),
property status (present, absent), and property type (sex-linked, shared) as the factors. It is a
within-subject design; each subject provided ratings for items in each condition.
A subject and item analysis, followed by planned comparisons, were used to test whether
in the presence of the sex-linked property (e.g., mane), the kind (e.g., mutant lion) and the sexlinked to the property (e.g., mutant male lion) explanation types received lower naturalness
ratings than the sex not linked to the property (e.g., mutant female lion) explanation types. This
was also used to test whether in the absence of the sex-linked property, the sex not linked to the
property (e.g., mutant female lion) received lower naturalness ratings than the kind (e.g., mutant
lion) or the sex linked to the property (e.g., mutant male lion). This analysis was also used to test
whether in the presence of the shared property, all three explanations would be equally low, and
in the absence of the property, the explanation referring to the mutant kind will be rated higher
than either sex.
Results

Sex-Linked Property Present in Mutant Kind
Sex-Linked Property Present in Mutant Sex Linked
Sex-Linked Property Present in Mutant Sex Not
Linked
Sex-Linked Property Absent in Mutant Kind
Sex-Linked Property Absent in Mutant Sex Linked
Sex-Linked Property Absent in Mutant Sex Not Linked
Shared Property Present in Mutant Kind
Shared Property Present in Mutant Sex Linked
Shared Property Present in Mutant Sex Not Linked

Mean
2.41
2.13
4.16

Standard Deviation
1.54
1.44
1.72

4.13
4.69
2.54
2.11
1.99
2.00

1.67
1.73
1.53
1.53
1.36
1.38
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Shared Property Absent in Mutant Kind

5.23
1.72
4.40
1.63
Shared Property Absent in Mutant Sex Not Linked
4.30
1.64
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of formal explanation ratings for the presence and absence of sex linked and
shared properties in mutant kinds.
Shared Property Absent in Mutant Sex Linked

Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for each measure in Experiment 3. For the
subject analysis, a three-way (2x2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect of
presence, property, and explanation type on formal explanation ratings for mutant animal kinds.
There was a statistically significant interaction between the three effects on formal explanation
ratings, F (2,352) =148.12, p<.001, η2 = .46. The analysis revealed a main effect of presence, F
(1,176) =267.82, p<.001, η2 = .60 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 352) =15.96, p<.001, η2
= .08. There was no main effect of property, F (1,176) = .02, p >.05.
In addition to the above, a 2x3 subject ANOVA for the presence of the property with
factors property (sex-linked/shared) and explanation (kind, sex-linked, non-sex linked) was
conducted. The analysis revealed a main effect of property type, F (1,176) =197.04, p<.001, η2 =
.53 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 352) =113.25, p<.001, η2 = .39. There is a significant
interaction present between property and explanation, F (2,352) =136.74, p<.001, η2 = .44.
Lastly, we ran a 2x3 subject ANOVA for the absence of the property with factors
property (sex-linked/shared) and explanation type (kind, sex-linked, non-sex linked). The
analysis revealed a main effect of property type, F (1,176) =101.72, p<.001, η2 = .37 and a main
effect of explanation, F (2, 352) =145.32, p<.001, η2 = .45. There is also a significant interaction
present between property type and explanation type, F (2,352) =113.33, p<.001, η2 = .39. Next,
we ran pairwise t-tests to understand the nature of this interaction.
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Figure 5. Mean ratings for the presence of sex-linked properties and shared properties in mutant kinds.
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Figure 6. Mean ratings for the absence of sex-linked properties and shared properties in mutant kinds.

Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, when explaining
the presence (Figure 5) of a sex-linked property (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck) lay
eggs?”), formal explanations that referenced the mutant sex-not linked to the property (i.e.,
Because it is a mutant male duck) received significantly higher ratings than those referencing the
mutant kind (i.e., Because it is a mutant duck) (t(176)= 11.84 , p <.001) or the mutant sex linked
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to the property (i.e., Because it is a mutant female duck) (t(176)= 12.55, p <.001). When
explaining the absence of the sex-linked property (Figure 6), formal explanations referencing the
mutant kind (i.e., Because it is a mutant duck) (t(176)= 12.64 , p <.001) or the mutant sex-linked
to the property (i.e., Because it is a mutant female duck) (t(176)= 13.32 , p <.001) received
significantly higher ratings than those referencing the mutant sex not linked to the property (i.e.,
Because it is a mutant male duck). When explaining the presence (Figure 5) of a shared property
(i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck) have a beak?”), formal explanations that referenced the
mutant kind, mutant sex-linked, and mutant sex not linked all received low ratings which were
not significantly different. When explaining the absence (Figure 6) of a shared property, formal
explanations referencing the mutant kind received significantly higher ratings than formal
explanations referencing the mutant sex linked (t(176)= 9.57 , p <.001) and the mutant sex not
linked (t(176)= 10.27 , p <.001).
For the item analysis, a three-way (2x2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the
effect of presence, property, and explanation type on formal explanation ratings for mutant
animal kinds. There was a statistically significant interaction between the three effects on formal
explanation ratings, F (2,14) =323.25, p<.001, η2 = .98. The analysis revealed a main effect of
presence, F (1,7) =2,283.27, p<.001, η2 = .98 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 14) =45.16,
p<.001, η2 = .87. There is no main effect of property, F (2,14) = .039, p >.05.
In addition to the above, a 2x3 item ANOVA for the presence of the property with
factors property (sex-linked/shared) and explanation (kind, sex-linked, non-sex linked) was
conducted. The analysis revealed a main effect of property type, F (1,7) =383.44, p<.00, η2 = .98
and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 14) =304.60, p<.001, η2 = .98. There is a significant
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interaction present between property type and explanation type, F (2,14) =342.49, p<.001, η2 =
.98.
Lastly, we ran a 2x3 item ANOVA for the absence of the property with factors property
(sex-linked/shared) and explanation type (kind, sex-linked, non-sex linked). The analysis
revealed a main effect of property type, F (1,7) =244.51, p<.001, η2 = .97 and a main effect of
explanation, F (2, 14) =396.97, p<.001, η2 = .98. There is a significant interaction present
between property type and explanation type, F (2,14) =186.17, p<.001, η2 = .96. Next, we ran
pairwise t-tests to understand the nature of this interaction.
Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, when explaining
the presence (Figure 5) of a sex-linked property (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck) lay
eggs?”), formal explanations that referenced the mutant sex-not linked to the property (i.e.,
Because it is a mutant male duck) received significantly higher ratings than those referencing the
mutant kind (i.e., Because it is a mutant duck) (t(7)= 19.13 , p <.001) or the mutant sex linked to
the property (i.e., Because it is a mutant female duck) (t(7)= 19.24, p <.001). When explaining
the absence of the sex-linked property (Figure 6), formal explanations referencing the mutant
kind (i.e., Because it is a mutant duck) (t(7)= 17.90 , p <.001) or the mutant sex-linked to the
property (i.e., Because it is a mutant female duck) (t(7)= 19.85 , p <.001) received significantly
higher ratings than those referencing the mutant sex not linked to the property (i.e., Because it is
a mutant male duck). When explaining the presence (Figure 5) of a shared property (i.e., “Why
does that (pointing to a duck) have a beak?”), formal explanations that referenced the mutant
kind, mutant sex-linked, and mutant sex not linked all received low ratings, with the mutant kind
receiving significantly higher ratings than either the mutant sex-linked (t(7)= 4.39 , p <.009) or
mutant sex not linked (t(7)= 3.30 , p <.038). When explaining the absence (Figure 6) of a shared
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property, formal explanations referencing the mutant kind received significantly higher ratings
than formal explanations referencing the mutant sex linked (t(7)= 12.82 , p <.001) and the
mutant sex not linked (t(7)= 20.78 , p <.001).
Discussion
Experiment 3 provides evidence that, as predicted, participants found it natural to explain
the presence of sex-linked properties (i.e. “Why does that (pointing to a duck) lay eggs?”) by
citing the mutant sex not linked to the property (i.e., Because it is a mutant male duck), and not
the mutant kind (Because it is a mutant duck) or the mutant sex linked to the property (Because it
is a mutant female duck). Participants also found it natural to explain the absence of sex-linked
properties (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck) not lay eggs?) by citing the mutant sex
linked to the property (Because it is a mutant female duck) and the mutant kind (Because it is a
mutant duck). Experiment 3 also provides evidence that, as predicted, participants did not find it
natural to explain the presence of a shared property (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck)
have a beak?”) by citing the mutant kind (Because it is a mutant duck), the mutant sex linked
(Because it is a mutant female duck), or the mutant sex not linked (Because it is a mutant male
duck). Lastly, experiment 3 showed that participants found it natural to explain the absence of a
shared property (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a duck) not have a beak?”) by referencing all
three mutant kind explanations, however participants found that referencing the mutant kind
(Because it is a mutant duck) is significantly more natural than referencing the mutant sex-linked
(Because it is a mutant female duck) or the mutant sex not linked (Because it is a mutant male
duck).
This experiment directly highlights the problem with generics and sex-linked properties.
The results provide evidence that there is a significant difference in the way that we look at the
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presence and absence of sex-linked properties in comparison to shared properties in animal
kinds. As both properties are thought to be principally connected to the kind, the ratings should
theoretically be the same for both the sex-linked and the shared properties. This is not the case.
Experiment 3 supports the theory that there is a problem with the way sex-linked properties are
represented while also providing evidence in support of the solution that we’ve proposed (i.e.,
the sex-linked property has a principled connection to the kind such that the presence of the
property has a principled connection to the sex that is linked to the property and the absence of
the property is principally connected to the opposite sex).
Experiment 4
Sex-linked properties (e.g., manes for lions) have principled connections to kind
representations such that instances of the sex the property is linked to have a principled
connection to the property (e.g. there is a principled connection between having a mane and
being a male lion). As such, there should be a universal normative expectation for instances of
that sex (e.g. All male lions are supposed to have manes), but only a general expectation that all
instances actually do have the characteristic and thus universal descriptive statements (e.g. All
male lions have manes) should be less likely to be judged to be true. Experiment 4 investigates
this connection the normative and the statistical aspect of principled connections. We predicted
(i) that the normative statements will receive higher ratings than the descriptive statements for
the sex-linked category; (ii) a smaller difference in the same direction for the statements about
the kind; and (iii) no difference between the normative and descriptive statements for the nonsex-linked category.
Method
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Participants
A total of 192 individuals, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in this
survey which was hosted on Qualtrics. All participants were native English speakers, 18 years or
older, and residing in the United States. The survey completion time was approximately 15
minutes. Each participant that completed the survey received $1.50 for participating.
Materials
A total of 52 questions were presented in the survey. Out of these, 48 questions were
asked specifically referring to normative or descriptive statements in animal kinds, equating to 6
questions per animal kind. 8 animal kinds were used throughout this experiment (the same
animal kinds as experiment 1). The eight chosen animal kinds were the ones that we felt
possessed well known sex-linked properties, such as manes for lions or laying eggs for ducks.
Out of the six questions for each kind, three showed descriptive statements (e.g., “all lions have
manes”) and three showed normative statements (e.g., “all lions are supposed to have manes”).
Each of the three statements pertained to one kind or sex (i.e., lions, male lions, female lions).
The general structure of each statement followed the following format: “All type (i.e., lions/male
lions/female lions) have/are supposed to have sex-linked property (i.e., manes). This study also
included four attention checks (e.g., “Select the number x from the below options.”), which were
answered 99% correctly by all participants, showing that they were paying attention to the
questions presented.
Procedure
Each participant took the same survey, with all questions displayed in random order (see
Appendix D for full stimuli and question descriptions). The structure was the same for each

36

REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

question. Participants were shown a statement and then were asked to judge the extent to which
the statement struck them as true or false on a 7-point scale. For each question, the participant
would see a statement such as “all lions are supposed to have manes” or “all lions have manes”.
The participant is then asked to rate the statement on a 7-point scale from negative three to
positive three, negative three signifying that the statement in question struck the participant as
definitely false and positive three signifying that the statement in question struck the participant
as definitely true.
This was a 2x3 within-subject design with type of statement (Normative/Descriptive) and
Category (Kind/Sex-linked/Non-sex-linked) as the independent variables. It was a within-subject
design as each subject provided ratings for items in each condition.
A 2x3 ANOVA examined the effects of expectation type (kind, sex linked to property,
sex not linked to property. A subject and item analysis, followed by planned comparisons, were
used to test whether in the presence of the sex-linked property (e.g., mane), the kind (e.g., lion)
and the sex-linked to the property (e.g., male lion) expectation types received higher truth ratings
than the sex not linked to the property (e.g., female lion) expectation types. This was also used to
test whether in the absence of the sex-linked property, the sex not linked to the property (e.g.,
female lion) received higher truth ratings than the kind (e.g., lion) or the sex linked to the
property (e.g., male lion). The item analysis allows for us to generalize the results to the whole
population of animals and sex-linked properties.
Results

Mean
Normative Statements for Kind
Normative Statements For Sex Linked

-1.60
2.24

Standard
Deviation
1.10
.77
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Normative Statement For Sex Not Linked

-2.08
.98
-1.72
1.09
Descriptive Statements For Sex Linked
1.85
1.01
Descriptive Statement For Sex Not Linked
-2.11
.90
Table 4. Means and standard deviations of truth ratings for normative and descriptive statements regarding sex
linked properties in kinds.
Descriptive Statements for Kind

Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for Experiment 4. For the subject analysis, a two-way
(2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect of statement type and explanation on
participants ratings. There was a statistically significant interaction between the effects of
statement type and explanation on participant ratings, F (2,382) =22.70, p<.001, η2 = .11. The
analysis revealed a main effect of statement type, F (1,191) =36.5, p<.001, η2 = .16 and a main
effect of explanation, F (2, 382) =1342.58, p<.001, η2 = .88. Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni
correction revealed that, as predicted, the normative ratings were significantly higher than the
descriptive ratings for the kind (t(191)= 3.23, p=.001) and for the sex-linked explanation types
(t(191)=6.86 , p<.001). Alternatively, there was no significant difference between the two types
of statements for the non-sex-linked explanation type.

Normative

Descriptive

3
2
2.24

Rating

1

1.85

0
-1

-1.60

-1.72

-2.08

-2
-3

Explanation Type
Figure 4. Mean normative and descriptive statement ratings for each explanation type.

-2.11
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Figure 7 shows the mean ratings for the normative and descriptive statements by
explanation type. For the item analysis, a two-way (2x3) ANOVA was conducted that examined
the effect of statement type and explanation on participants ratings. There was a statistically
significant interaction between the effects of statement type and explanation on participant
ratings, F (2,14) =21.00, p<.001, η2 = .75. The analysis revealed a main effect of statement Type,
F (1,7) =132.69, p<.001, η2 = .95 and a main effect of explanation, F (2, 14) =336.55, p<.001, η2
= .98. Pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, the normative
ratings were significantly higher than the descriptive ratings for the kind (t(7)= 4.67, p=.002) and
for the sex-linked explanation types (t(7)=7.52 , p<.001). Alternatively, there was no significant
difference between the two types of statements for the non-sex-linked explanation type.
Discussion
As predicted, there was a significant interaction present between type of statement and
explanation type. For statements involving the kind, both statement types received low ratings
however, the ratings for normative statements (M=-1.60) were significantly higher than the
descriptive statements (M=-1.72). Participants also endorsed normative statements that all
instances of the sex linked to a property are supposed to have the property (M=2.24), to a greater
extent than descriptive statements that they all have the property (M=1.85). This follows our
prediction that universal descriptive statements (i.e., All male lions have manes) should be less
likely to be judged to be true than universal normative statements (i.e., All male lions should
have manes). Lastly, as expected, there was no significant difference between statement types for
the statements involving the non-sex linked instances. This experiment provides evidence in
support of our general hypothesis. This provides evidence that normative and descriptive
(statistical) statements are intrinsically connected in principled connections.
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General Discussion
Experiment 1 confirms that formal explanations can be given for the presence of sexlinked properties by reference to the kind (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a lion) have a mane?”
“Because it is a lion”), and the sex linked to the property (i.e., “Why does that (pointing to a lion)
have a mane?” “Because it is a male lion”), and the absence of sex-linked properties can be
explained by reference to the opposite sex/sex not linked to the properties (“Why does that
(pointing to a lion) not have a mane?” “Because it is a female lion”).
Experiment 2 confirms the existence of normative expectations regarding the presence of
sex-linked properties for the kind (i.e., “Lions are supposed to have manes”), and the sex linked
to the property (i.e., “Male lions are supposed to have manes”), and normative expectations for
the absence of the sex-linked properties in the opposite sex/sex not linked to the properties (i.e.,
“Female lions are supposed to not have manes”).
Experiment 3 tied the formal explanations and the normative expectations together, while
revealing the significant differences between sex-linked properties and shared properties.
Experiment 4 revealed that, unlike what previous research regarding minority trait characteristics
has stated, we have statistical expectations regarding sex-linked properties. Furthermore, it
showed that normative and descriptive (statistical) expectations are intrinsically connected in
principled connections.
The experiments listed above confirm that animate kinds formally distinguish instances
of two types (male/female) such that instances of the two types differ in a principled manner.
These experiments also provide clear evidence in support of our hypothesis that the principled
difference between the two types of instances is due to instances of one type having a principled
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connection for the presence of a sex-linked property, and the other type having a principled
connection for the absence of that property. Generics like "Ducks lay eggs" are licensed because
we represent a lawful connection between the kind and the property, not just between one sex
and the property.
How do present results bear on previous ideas about sex-linked properties (minority trait
characteristics)?
Previous research has argued that minority trait characteristic generics do not need to
possess the statistical component in order to be considered principally connected to the kind
(Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013). This explanation is used to accommodate for

the sex that does not possess the minority trait characteristics. Experiment 4 provides evidence
that there is in fact a strong statistical connection between the sex-linked property and the kind.
This suggests that we do not lack statistical expectations in principled connections.
Prior research on minority trait characteristics asserts that principled connections involve
normative expectations (Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, 2013) however, it does not
account for the opposite sex (i.e., we do not consider female lions to be defective). Experiment 2
provides evidence that there are normative expectations for the presence of the property in one
sex, and normative expectations for the absence in the property in the opposite sex. This is an
improvement to current theories as it does not require us to consider the sex which is not linked
to the property and thus lacks the property as being defective.
Some prior research has also argued that “lions have manes” really refers to male lions,
or all mature male lions, having manes (Declerck, 1991). The limitation present in this research
is that if this is the case, it says that we don’t have any expectations for female lions. However,
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all of the present experiments provide evidence that we do indeed have expectations for female
lions, and generally have expectations for the sex-linked instances of the kind and the non-sexlinked instances of the kind.
Lastly, previous work has shown that conceptual representations include descriptive
characteristics (i.e., what a kind has) (e.g. Medin, 1989; Murphy, 2002) and prescriptive
characteristics (i.e., what a kind should have) (e.g. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009; Prasada et
al., 2013; Haward et al., 2018). The research in the present studies provides evidence that in
some cases, concepts also specify proscriptive characteristics (i.e., what a kind should not have).
The results of these experiments also enhance our knowledge of how we represent concepts of
animals and sex differences found in members of animal categories.
Implications of this work for our understanding of generic and principled connections
Previously, evidence for each of the three aspects (i.e., formal, normative, statistical) of
principled connections was provided separately. Experiment 3 provides evidence that formal
explanations and normative expectations are intrinsically connected. Experiment 4 provides
evidence that normative expectations and statistical expectations are also intrinsically connected.
This indicates that principled connections always carry explanatory, normative, and statistical
connections. The evidence also shows that principled connections involve a connection to the
kind, and not just to one type of instance of the kind (e.g., male/female). For example, “lions
have manes” should be interpreted as a statement about the kind lions and not just a statement
about male lions. The present experiments provide evidence that there is a lawful connection
between lions and manes. Female lions are lawfully connected to the absence of manes and male
lions are lawfully connected to the presence of manes. This explains why generics involving the
kind and a sex-linked property are licensed (e.g., Lions have manes), as well as why generics
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involving both the sex linked to the property (e.g., Male lions have manes) and the sex not linked
to the property are also licensed (e.g., Female lions do not have manes).
Considerations for future research
An important consideration for future research would be to investigate how children learn
about sex-linked properties. This research could also investigate how children know that sexlinked properties involve principled connections, and at what age do children tend to possess this
knowledge. A study investigating how children understand and represent generics involving
gender categories found that children as young as 4.5 years old derive inferences regarding
unmentioned categories in generic claims (Moty and Rhodes, 2021). The study provided
evidence that when children are presented with a statement about one group, they will naturally
assume this statement is not true for the other group. Perhaps this could be the case with lions
and manes. Evidence also shows that the tendency for children to draw inferences about the
neglected categories strengthens with age (Moty and Rhodes, 2021). It may be important to
understand how this result ties in with regard to principled connections, and whether they
involve the same process. Principled connections were not present in any of the items provided
to the children however, it would be interesting to replicate the experiment with sex-linked
properties specifically.
An additional consideration for future research may be to conduct a study similar to this
one but pertaining to sex-linked properties in humans. More specifically, investigating how the
ratings for formal explanations, normative expectations, and statistical components may be
different when referring to sex-linked properties in women and men. It may be interesting to
compare those results with the results for animal kinds since animals do not have concepts of
gender in the same way that humans do. It may also be interesting to incorporate the survey

REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

across several generations of people in order to see whether ratings differ significantly based
upon age. Lastly, some additional questions for future research include: Could there be
properties that do not involve principled connections but could always be found in one sex and
not the other? How can our knowledge of generics and kind concepts be used to explain the
differences between queen bees and worker bees in the generic “Bees make honey”? Is that
distinction represented in the same way as sex differences are represented?
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Appendix A
Appendix A: Stimuli and script for Experiment 1
Table A1
Kinds, Sex-Linked Properties, and Sexes Linked/Not Linked to Property for Experiment 1, 2, and 4

Sex-Linked Property

Kind

Sex-Linked to Property Sex Not Linked to Property

Mane

Lion

Male Lion

Female Lion

Laying Eggs

Duck

Female Duck

Male Duck

Udders

Cow

Female Cow

Male Cow

Colorful Tail Feathers Peacock

Male Peacock

Female Peacock

Pouch

Kangaroo

Female Kangaroo

Male Kangaroo

Producing Milk

Sheep

Female Sheep

Male Sheep

Antlers

Deer

Male Deer

Female Deer

Horns

Goat

Male Goat

Female Goat

A.1. Question Template for Experiment 1
Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to kind] (have/not have) a sex-linked property?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a (kind/sex-linked to property/sex not linked to property)."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
Example: LION
For Presence in Kind: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.

REPRESENTATION OF SEX-LINKED PROPERTIES

47

For Presence in Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a male lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Presence in Non-Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a
mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a female lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Kind: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a
mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a male lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Non-Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a
mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a female lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
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Appendix B
Appendix B: Script for Experiment 2
Refer to Table A1 for stimuli
B.1. Question Template for Experiment 2
"(Kind/Sex-Linked/Sex Not Linked) are supposed to (have/not have) (sex-linked property)."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
Example: LION
For Presence in Kind: "Lions are supposed to have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Presence in Sex-Linked: "Male lions are supposed to have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Presence in Non-Sex Linked: "Female lions are supposed to have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Absence in Kind: "Lions are supposed to not have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Absence in Sex-Linked: "Male lions are supposed to not have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Absence in Non-Sex Linked: "Female lions are supposed to not have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
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Appendix C
Appendix C: Stimuli and Script for Experiment 2
Table C1
Kinds, Sex-Linked and Shared Properties, and Sexes Linked/Not Linked to Property for
Experiment 3

Sex-Linked Property
Property

Shared Property

Kind Sex-Linked to Property Sex Not Linked to

Mane

Tail

Lion

Male Lion

Female Lion

Laying Eggs

Webbed Feet

Duck

Female Duck

Male Duck

Udders

Ears

Cow

Female Cow

Male Cow

Colorful Tail Feathers Beak

Peacock

Male Peacock

Female Peacock

Pouch

Hop

Kangaroo

Female Kangaroo

Male Kangaroo

Producing Milk

Wool

Sheep

Female Sheep

Male Sheep

Antlers

Hooves

Deer

Male Deer

Female Deer

Horns

Four Legs

Goat

Male Goat

Female Goat

C.1. Question Template for Experiment 3
Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to kind] (have/not have) a (sex-linked property/shared
property)?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant (kind/sex-linked to property/sex not linked to
property)."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
Example: LION
For Sex-Linked Property:
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For Presence in Kind: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Presence in Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant male lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Presence in Non-Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a
mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant female lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Kind: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a
mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant male lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Non-Sex-Linked: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a
mane?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant female lion."
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Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.

For Shared Property:
For Presence in Kind: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] have a tail?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Presence in Sex Linked to Sex-Linked Property: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing
to a lion] have a tail?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant male lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Presence in Sex Not Linked to Sex-Linked Property: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that
[pointing to a lion] have a tail?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant female lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Kind: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing to a lion] not have a tail?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Sex Linked to Sex-Linked Property: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that [pointing
to a lion] not have a tail?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant male lion."
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Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
For Absence in Sex Not Linked to Sex-Linked Property: Suppose someone asked, "Why does that
[pointing to a lion] not have a tail?"
Suppose they received the reply, "Because it is a mutant female lion."
Please indicate how natural this reply sounds as a response to the question that was asked.
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Appendix D
Appendix D: Stimuli and Script for Experiment 4
Refer to Table A1 for stimuli
D.1. Question Template for Experiment 4
"All (Kind/Sex-Linked/Sex Not Linked) (have/are supposed to have) (sex-linked property)."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
Example: LION
For Normative Kind: "All lions are supposed to have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Normative Sex-Linked: "All male lions are supposed to have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Normative Non-Sex Linked: "All female lions are supposed to have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Descriptive Kind: "All lions have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Descriptive Sex-Linked: "All male lions have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.
For Descriptive Non-Sex Linked: "All female lions have manes."
Please provide a judgement as to whether the statement strikes you as true or not.

